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ABSTRACT  
Using a panel dataset of more than 40,000 Greek corporations over the period 2001-
2014, the paper examines how their size measured by past turnover affects survival 
prospects and turnover growth. The analysis is carried out along three dimensions: (a) 
time-wise, by looking at the dynamics before and after the crisis in 2010; (b) sector-wise, 
by grouping firms in six areas of economic activity, namely manufacturing, construction, 
trade, recreation, real-estate, and the combined sectors of transport & communications; 
(c) region-wise, by examining firms in Northern Greece, the wider Attiki region, and the 
rest of the country. Other firm’s characteristics like age, market share, leverage, and 
fixed asset ratio are also used as explanatory variables in the econometric estimation. 
Investigation takes place in the framework known in the literature as the Gibrat’s Law, 
according to which market turnover is a random walk process and larger-size firms 
belong to the same population with smaller ones. Our findings suggest that in Greece 
larger-size firms were, in general, more likely to survive in the market than smaller ones 
and this relative advantage grew stronger during the crisis. Focusing on sectors, it is 
established that large companies in the manufacturing sector are by far more robust 
over the cycle, while those in the Real Estate and construction sectors manifest the 
highest extinction rate. Moreover, the rate of turnover growth for those firms survived 
is found to be negatively associated with their size, thus not confirming Gibrat’s Law in 
Greece. 
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1. Introduction  
A recurring theme in industrial economics is whether, and to what extent, the size of 
firms influences their chances of staying in the market and/or the prospects for further 
expansion in turnover. If the effect is positive, it points to the existence of economies of 
scale as firms realize that by increasing size they are likely to secure a higher market 
share relative to smaller-size firms. If negative, it points to diseconomies of scale due 
either to internal factors such as increasing marginal costs or external obstacles to 
market expansion, such as - for example - congestion effects, over-regulation, etc. 
Between the two opposite assumptions, market expansion might after all be 
independent of the size of firms, in which case the Law of Proportionate Effect is said to 
prevail. The hypothesis is known as ‘Gibrat’s Law’ after French mathematician Robert 
Gibrat published a relevant analysis (Gibrat 1931). The Law amounts to assuming that 
market turnover is a random walk process and firms follow a lognormal distribution, no 
matter their size. In other words, larger-size firms belong to the same population with 
smaller ones and are equally likely to expand their turnover.   
The simplicity, generality and intuition behind Gibrat’s Law generated a prolific empirical 
literature aiming to test its validity in actual economies. Santarelli et al. (2006) provided 
one of the most comprehensive surveys describing more than sixty cases in different 
countries and over different periods, analyzed by employing a variety of econometric 
methods. Sectors with low capital requirements (i.e. the service sector) or populations 
of large firms appear to validate the hypothesis, as their expansion is independent of 
each particular size, but it seems to fail in other cases. The authors conclude that the 
hypothesis of Gibrat’s Law is far from being an uncontested assumption, thus, it cannot 
really be a guiding principle in the analysis of market developments applied universally. 
This makes the investigation of Gibrat’s Law an issue of importance that is specific to 
each country, epoch and sector of activity, rather than a unified pattern. 
Furthermore, measuring the size effect on turnover growth might be of particular 
interest if examined over different phases of the business cycle. In the upturn of a cycle, 
the establishment of Gibrat’s Law implies that market prospects open up to all firms, no 
matter their size, thus new firms enter across the spectrum of existing ones. In the 
downturn, several firms get out of business and Gibrat’s Law amounts to making no size-
related prediction regarding their survival. In contrast, a rejection of Gibrat’s Law may 
provide decision-makers with valuable insights regarding the size of firms that are more 
likely to enter in the upswing or exit after a crisis. 
In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the extent to which the properties of the 
firms’ life-cycle depend on size may be of critical importance for their chances of survival 
and plans of restructuring. To the best of our knowledge, such questions have not yet 
received adequate attention in the existing empirical literature3. To fill the gap, we set 
out to investigate their relevance over a period that includes both an upswing and a 
                                                     
3An early empirical investigation of the issue by Boeri et al. (1995) for German establishments found low 
responsiveness of firms’ growth or exit to aggregate cyclical fluctuations. Higson et al. (2004) report lower 
degree of sensitivity to aggregate shocks for UK firms at the tails of the cross-sectional growth distribution. 
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downswing phase taking place in Greece, a country distinctively hit by the global crisis 
of 2008 and the subsequent debt crisis of 2010. Indeed, the Greek economy reflects 
both phases of the cycle more starkly than any other does: during 2001-2008, Greek 
GDP on average was growing by 3.50% per year, and then experienced a cumulative fall 
by -22% by the end of 2014. 
Figure 1: Population of operating firms and real GDP, 2001-2014. 
 
Notes: Firms in thousands; GDP in €bn at 2010 prices. Source: Hellastat database. 
The severe contraction in economic activity was not a one-off effect but rather a 
cumulative effect of the crisis spiral: In fact, as the global crisis started to unfold, Greece 
suffered only a mild recession and decision-makers in both Government and the 
European Union seemed to be reluctant on adopting emergency policy measures. 
However, in 2010, public debt and deficits went out of control and the country was 
denied access to financial markets. To avoid a sovereignty default, the European Union 
and the International Monetary Fund bailed out Greece in exchange for a front-loaded 
austerity programme. Under the measures envisaged by the adjustment programme, 
aggregate demand collapsed and the economy entered a prolonged period of recession; 
for a detailed analysis of the background and the effects of the Greek crisis see 
Christodoulakis (2016). 
In the aftermath of the debt crisis, Greek firms faced several existential challenges, 
beyond those associated with market fluctuations over the business cycle. Several firms 
starved for lack of working capital, even if their sales or export prospects remained 
relatively unscathed. With liquidity draining out of the banking system, Greek firms 
became more pre-occupied with their survival rather than setting ambitious targets for 
further growth. As higher taxes on sales started to bite, several firms exited Greece by 
transferring operations elsewhere, without necessarily implying that they could no more 
compete in the market.  
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As shown in Figure 1, the population of firms moved in a roughly similar – though not 
identical – pattern with overall economic activity, as expressed by real GDP (see also 
Table I below).  It is worth noting, however, that only few firms did quit the market 
immediately and was only after the recession deepened when firms begun to exit at a 
massive scale: In 2014, the number of surviving firms had returned to the population 
prevailing at the beginning of the century.  
Hence, it is critical to explain how the determinants of growth and survival vary over 
time and across sectors of economic activity in Greece. Thus far, the role of firms’ size 
on their market expansion and survival in Greece is examined to only a limited extent or 
just for specific sectors. For example, Vlachvei et al. (2007) used a small sample of 
manufacturing and trading firms in Greece for the period 1995-2000 and found that 
results are sensitive to the choice of variables measuring size and growth, thus reaching 
no conclusion regarding Gibrat’s Law. Similarly, Fotopoulos et al. (2010) detected no 
indication of Gibrat’s Law in their study of the Greek manufacturing sector over the 
period 1995-2001, while a subsequent study for the service sector by Giotopoulos et al. 
(2010)produced mixed results. Furthermore, their estimation methodology used 
balanced panel data and, therefore, was not capable of addressing issues such as entry 
or exit of firms. A recent exception was the study by Kontolaimou et al.(2017) on the 
behavior of small and medium enterprises before and after the recent financial crisis. 
However, by considering only surviving firms in their empirical analysis the study could 
not address survival effects on growth and vice versa. 
The econometric analysis of firms’ survival and their size effect on turnover growth 
requires a proper framework of identification and estimation, as described in the 
literature. Audretsch (1995) has explained the systematic variations of the 
aforementioned effects from industry to industry by the differences in innovation 
activity across markets. Analyzing the dynamics of firms’ distribution has been the 
subject of several studies: an early attempt was by Quah(1993) to examine cross-
sectional distributions, while Cabral et al. (2003) investigated the log-distribution of 
firms’ sizes over time and across age cohorts. Ribeiro(2007) performed simple cross-
sectional estimations for each year, while Lotti et al.(2009) employed Heckman’s (1979) 
correction to face selection bias. More recently, Hutchinson et al. (2010) examined the 
distributional effects of inter-industry diversification, while Capasso et al. (2012) 
investigated the role of data truncation on firm size and growth rate variance. 
Meisenzahl (2016) addressed the impact of financial constraints on the evolution of firm 
size distribution, while Distante et al. (2018) analyze the effects of other economic and 
financial variables on growth and survival, using quantile regressions. 
By employing a large unbalanced panel dataset of more than 40,000 Greek firms over 
the period 2001-2014, we test Gibrat’s Law to find out whether and how their size 
affects survival and growth over two equal time-spans 2001-2008 and 2009-2014 
reflecting the conditions before and during the financial crisis. To obtain aggregate 
estimates for the two sub-periods in the presence of a continuous exiting/entering 
market process, we follow Wooldridge’s (2002) extension of the Heckman’s (1979) 
cross-sectional approach to panel data. Moreover, Semykina et al.(2013) described the 
importance of obtaining estimation results that remain robust to sample selection bias. 
For results to remain robust to unobserved time-invariant firm-specific heterogeneity, 
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our estimation method allows for cross-sectional fixed effects. In contrast to most of the 
existing empirical studies that mainly use balanced datasets to study firms’ growth and, 
therefore, suffer from possible selection bias, our approach constitutes one of the few 
attempts to estimate dynamic panel data models using unbalanced data and, thus, 
controlling for both survival and firm’s heterogeneity. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the data and discusses 
some characteristic effects that recession exerted on Greek firms. Section 3 describes 
the general econometric framework employed in the analysis, while Sections 4 and 5 
present the main findings on survival probabilities and turnover growth respectively. 
Finally, Section 6 draws some lessons for the character of policies aiming to support 
business firms in the aftermath of the Greek crisis, and outlines the directions of future 
research. 
 
 
2. Data and stylised facts 
We utilize an initial sample of 40,529 Greek corporations with the legal status of 
Société Anonymes (S.A.) for which annual data are available for the period 2001-2014, 
though not for all entries. Our sample is formed by collecting information from financial 
statements that SA firms are legally obliged to publish in the Official Government 
Gazette4. The sample contains firm-specific information for the year of establishment, 
the regional location of headquarters and sector of activity. It also contains annual 
information from firms’ financial statements, specifically for total and current assets, 
turnover, equity and finally, the earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation 
allowance, (i.e. the EBIDTA). After filtering out some invalid cases (listed below Table 
IA), we keep an unbalanced panel-data of 270,104 firm-years in total, each of them 
containing valid firm-specific annual information.  
The number of surviving firms for each year is shown in Table IA. Together, this Table 
reports aggregate statistics for the total number of Greek SA firms registered in the 
official Statistical Business Register (SBR). SBR is based on tax-related data and may 
therefore show substantial differences from our dataset especially in cases of inactive 
firms, which do not timely declare business closure to the tax authorities. This is 
available online from 2011 onwards via the Hellenic Statistical Authority’s website.5 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
4Other legal types (including local branches) cover less than ten percent of our original sample and our 
therefore left out from the present analysis. 
5
 Source: Data are from  www.statistics.gr 
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Table IA: Number of Firms with Valid Observations 
Year 
200
1 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Number of 
firms 
153
40 
1843
0 
1947
7 
2066
0 
2106
2 
2130
4 
2150
7 
2153
6 
2104
6 
2040
9 
1942
4 
1794
9 
1676
1 
1502
6 
Annual 
Percentage 
Change (%) 
 20.1 5.7 6.1 1.9 1.1 1.0 0.1 -2.3 -3.0 -4.8 -7.6 -6.6 -10.4 
Average (%) 5.2  -5,8 
Percentage 
of Firms in 
the 
Statistical 
Business 
Register  
          71.8 69.4 67.6 52.1 
Notes: Table shows the number of firms in the filtered sample after exclusion of cases which 
violate at least one of the following conditions: (a) Total Assets ≥ Current Assets > 0, (b) Total 
Assets ≥ Equity, (c) Turnover > 0, (d) Age > 0, where Age = Current Year – Year of Establishment 
+ 1. We do not filter out firm-years with negative equity records, as they may signal cases where 
firms face insolvency or high debt issues, but still manage to survive and publish regular reports. 
We also excluded firms with reporting discontinuities. This led to reductions in the sample size 
ranging from less than 10% of firms in the Manufacturing and Trade Sectors to about 18% of 
firms in the Construction and/or Recreation Sectors. Source: Hellastat database. Statistics from 
the Statistical Business Register are available from 2011 onwards and obtained from the ELSTAT 
website: https://www.statistics.gr/el/statistics/-/publication/SBR01/-. 
 
 
Table IB: Annual Statistics from filtered (F.S.) and unfiltered (UF.S) samples 
Year 
200
1 
200
2 
200
3 
200
4 
200
5 
200
6 
200
7 
200
8 
200
9 
201
0 
201
1 
201
2 
201
3 
201
4 
Number of Firms 
UF.S. 
188
14 
216
62 
230
53 
242
76 
247
92 
251
66 
259
28 
260
87 
256
04 
254
07 
239
43 
217
38 
208
12 
186
21 
F.S. 
153
40 
184
30 
194
77 
206
60 
210
62 
213
04 
215
07 
215
36 
210
46 
204
09 
194
24 
179
49 
167
61 
150
26 
% of 
UF.S. 
81.
5 
85.
1 
84.
5 
85.
1 
85.
0 
84.
7 
82.
9 
82.
6 
82.
2 
80.
3 
81.
1 
82.
6 
80.
5 
80.
7 
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Median Turnover (in million Euros) 
UF.S. (1) 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 
F.S (2) 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.1 
(2) - (1): 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
% of 
UF.S. 
21.
2 
18.
3 
19.
2 
17.
5 
17.
2 
20.
0 
22.
8 
22.
1 
22.
6 
25.
3 
26.
6 
22.
7 
29.
2 
29.
4 
Median Turnover Growth (%) 
UF.S. (1)   3.7 3.8 3.6 1.5 6.7 7.3 2.9 -8.6 -9.2 -9.0 
-
11.
5 -1.2 2.1 
F.S (2)   4.1 4.3 4.0 1.6 6.9 7.6 2.9 -8.8 -9.5 -9.3 
-
11.
8 -1.3 2.0 
(2) - (1):   0.4 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 
Median Age (in Years) 
UF.S. (1) 9 9 9 10 10 11 12 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
F.S. (2) 9 9 9 10 10 11 12 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
(2) - (1): 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Exit rate (%) 
UF.S (1)   7.7 5.5 7.2 7.1 6.5 6.0 7.6 9.2 8.6 
11.
3 
14.
0 
10.
2 
13.
6 
F.S. (2)   5.3 4.0 4.8 5.3 4.9 4.5 5.6 6.4 6.6 8.7 
10.
2 8.7 
12.
2 
(2) - (1):   -2.4 -1.6 -2.4 -1.8 -1.6 -1.5 -2.0 -2.8 -2.1 -2.6 -3.9 -1.5 -1.4 
Notes: The Table shows the statistics from an unfiltered sample (UF.S.), which contains only non-
missing turnover data. They are compared against the corresponding figures from the filtered 
sample (F.S.) as described in the text.  
As shown in Table IB, compared with an unfiltered sample that contains only non-
missing turnover data, our filtered sample contains on average more than 80 percent of 
firms. A median comparison across basic variables reveals that the filter sample includes 
firms with (i) higher sales, (ii) better performance before and during the economic crisis 
in terms of higher (lower) annual turnover growth before (after) 2008, (iii) lower exit 
rates consistently before and during the economic crisis and (iv) no significant 
differences in terms of age. Table 1B also shows that the increased growth of the filtered 
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sample size observed in Table 1A for the year 2002 (20.1%) is not a result of this 
particular filtering, but may be attributed to other factors, such as the launch of the 
euro, which may have affected firms’ reporting process. 
Figure 2: (a) Size populations of operating firms 
Absolute Size 
 
 
Relative to Total Annual Size 
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 (b) Median growth rate of annual turnover 
 
Notes: Ranked in terciles by constant turnover thresholds (QLow, QHigh) over the period 2002-
2014. QLow= 0.51 million Euros, QLow= 2.2 million Euros. Source: Hellastat database. 
To get a first impression of how the size and composition of total firm population vary 
over the cycle, operating companies are classified as being small, medium or large ones 
by setting three fixed thresholds corresponding to the 33% and 67% terciles of annual 
turnover distribution across all firm-years of the initial sample. Subsequently, the 
terciles populations are juxtaposed versus turnover growth.   
A similar analysis is conducted per sector of economic activity. Using sample information 
for the firms’ sector of activity6 we identify the six most populous, (i.e. with the highest 
number of firms), as follows: (1) Real Estate, (2) the TLC sector, including Transportation, 
Logistics and Communication, (3) Construction, (4) Recreation, including Hotels and 
Restaurants, (5) Trade, both wholesale and retail, and, (6) Manufacturing. Jointly, these 
sectors account for more than 90% of the firms surviving in each year. The rest consists 
of a small number of companies in the agricultural sector or elsewhere, with very low 
turnover to have a noticeable effect in our analysis. The following stylised facts are 
established: 
Fact #1. Turnover growth vs. size: The panels in Figure 2 depict the patterns of the three 
terciles of size distribution regarding their population and median growth rates, 
respectively. The first panel shows that in the upswing, the population of large firms 
increased more rapidly, while the population of small firms shrunk and that of medium 
size remained virtually stable. These findings suggest that firms initially not grouped as 
large ones exploited market prospects and subsequently advanced their ranking from 
small to medium and from medium to large ones. This provides an early indication that 
market expansion might be stronger for smaller and medium-size firms or, in other 
words, the size coefficient in Gibrat’s equation is not likely to be positive and statistically 
significant. For the same reason, the fall in aggregate sales during recession hits larger-
                                                     
6The classification in the Greek statistical system is STAKOD-03. 
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size firms more strongly, thus pushing them to the terciles of medium or small size firms. 
As shown in Figure 2a, the population of larger firms falls at a fast rate, while the 
population of small ones remains relatively stable between 2010 and 2013. 
Figure 3: Populations of operating firms ranked by turnover and growth thresholds. 
Absolute Size 
 
 
Relative to Total Annual Size 
 
Notes: Thresholds correspond to the 33% and 67% terciles of the distribution across all firm-
years of the initial sample, 2002-2014. Source: Hellastat database. 
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The role of size is further illuminated by looking at the median growth. The panel in 
Figure 2b shows that the median growth rates in sales are not systematically different 
among small, medium and larger-size firms in the upswing. In the downswing phase, the 
sales by small firms fall proportionately less during 2009-2011, though later they follow 
a virtually common pattern. 
In the first panel of Figure 3, the terciles of growth in sales are associated with those of 
size over time. Before the crisis, there seems to be no systematic differentiation 
between smaller and larger-size firms in growing fast. After the crisis, a higher 
proportion of small firms appears to have a better record in sales (i.e. a milder fall) than 
larger ones. In the second panel of Figure 3,it is worth mentioning the rapid increase in 
the number of large firms with a low sales record at the beginning of the crisis, though 
the effect dissipates later on. Again, the implication is that the size effect in Gibrat’s Law 
is probably insignificant or negatively signed, confirming a similar conjecture in Figure 
2a.  
Fact #2. Survival vs. size: The pattern changes markedly regarding the survival of firms. 
Figure 4 depicts the exit rate of the three size-terciles, showing that smaller firms are 
more vulnerable for exiting the market throughout the period and even more so after 
the crisis. In contrast, larger-size firms prove to be far more salient, though their exit 
rate somewhat increased after 2008. Medium-size firms seem to exit at roughly a double 
rate than larger-size firms, while smaller ones at a tremble such rate. 
Fact #3. Turnover growth by sectors: Figure 5depicts the population of firms in the 
various sectors and some interesting features readily emerge. The number of companies 
in the Real Estate and the Construction sector seem to rapidly expand before the crisis, 
but then shrink rather dramatically. In contrast, the population in the manufacturing 
sector experiences a mild increase before the crisis and then suffers a similarly mild 
reduction afterwards. Turnover growth rates seem to be roughly similar across sectors 
before the crisis; see Figure 6. After the crisis, turnover in the Construction and Trade 
sectors fall more rapidly during 2010-2012. Due to Greece attracting higher tourism 
shares in the wider regional market after 2010, the Recreation sector experienced the 
highest turnover growth especially during 2013 and 2014.7 
Fact #4. Survival by sectors: To examine survival in more detail, the exit rates per sector 
of economic activity are depicted in Figure 7a. For all sectors, exit rates remain virtually 
stable before the crisis and rise afterwards. Construction and Real Estate sectors exhibit 
the highest exit rates throughout,8 while the lowest rates characterize the 
Manufacturing companies, followed by those in Trade and Recreation sectors. 
 
                                                     
7 In 2012, tourist arrivals fell short of expectations mainly because of widespread political uncertainty as 
two successive general elections in May and June fuelled fears of an eventual exit from the Eurozone.  
8A surprisingly high outlier in 2002 for the construction sector is explained by the response of existing 
firms to new legislation on public projects companies. Adjusting to the new eligibility criteria envisaged 
by Law 2940/2001, about half of them merged in 2002 as reported in daily Kathimerini (4/2/2003). 
http://www.kathimerini.gr/141902/article/oikonomia/epixeirhseis/alla3e-shmantika-to-topio-ston-
xwro-twn-ergolhptikwn 
  
11 
Figure 4: Exit rate (in percent) per size of firms ranked by last-period turnover.  
 
Notes: Ranked in terciles by constant turnover thresholds (QLow, QHigh) over the period 2002-
2014. QLow= 0.51 million Euros, QLow= 2.2 million Euros. Source: Hellastat database. 
 
 
Figure 5: Number of Firms for the six main sectors of activity 
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Figure 6: Turnover Growth (Median) for the six main sectors of activity 
 
 
Figure 7a: Exit Rates for the six main sectors of activity 
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Figure 7b: Exit rate (in percent) per size of firms and sector of activity 
 
Notes: Figure shows exit rates of small (dotted line), medium (dashed line) and large (straight 
line) firms ranked according to their turnover level at the previous year and using constant size 
thresholds that correspond to the terciles (QLow, QHigh) of the distribution of turnover across all 
firm–years. Source:  Hellastat database. 
Possible reasons for the notable failure of companies in the Construction and Real Estate 
sectors are the following:  
(a) Several new firms were established or expanded as demand for housing rose sharply 
during the pre-crisis boom but then suddenly collapsed due to the curtailment of bank 
credit;  
(b) Major construction projects financed for the occasion of the 2004 Olympic Games in 
Athens were terminated shortly afterwards;  
(c) Government co-financing of various infrastructural projects in the context of the 
European Structural Funds was seriously handicapped by the fiscal cuts following the 
bailout programme in 2010. 
Figure 7b depicts the exit rates of firms classified as large, medium and small ones across 
the six main sectors of activity. With few exceptions, it is obvious that larger-size firms 
show the lowest exit rate throughout the period of examination. Post-crisis, smaller 
firms seem to have the highest exit rate across all sectors, in accordance with the 
aggregate findings in Figure 4. Two explanations are likely for this behavior: One is the 
‘too big to fail’ argument, according to which larger firms are more likely to be connected 
with the banking system and, therefore, better prepared to face the lack of liquidity that 
hit the Greek economy after the crisis. In contrast, smaller firms saw their access to the 
banking sector to cut-off and went out of business as soon as the liquidity drain 
intensified. Another explanation is that larger firms have more downsize flexibility, as 
they can reduce employment and operations without jeopardising their core of activity. 
For smaller firms, downsising frequently amounts to cut business altogether. 
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3. Econometric analysis: Basic methodology and construction of 
variables 
In our econometric analysis, the cross-sectional Heckman selection model (or Heckit 
model, Heckman, 1979) is extended to estimate size effects on growth in our unbalanced 
panel dataset. Following the method proposed by Wooldridge (2002), we take account 
of possible selection bias due to entry and exit of firms in our panel and their effect on 
growth. We apply the method in two steps: In the first step, we estimate a Probit model 
for the probability of firms’ survival, conditional on a number of firm-specific and 
market-specific variables. In the second step, we estimate a growth equation 
augmented with a ‘selection’ term, which corrects for sample selection and which has 
been estimated in the first step. Before presenting the associated results across these 
steps, we define a number of firm-specific and market-specific variables to be used in 
the estimation. 
Following previous empirical studies (e.g. Santarelli, 2006), we use firms’ turnover to 
measure their size and condition the growth rate on firms’ age, profitability, liquidity9, 
and leverage. Regional location distinguishes between firms established in the wider 
Attiki region, all regions in Northern Greece, and the rest of the country. We also include 
firms’ investment activity as measured by the time evolution of fixed assets and the ratio 
over total assets as well as internal financing measured by equity growth, asin the 
studies by Fotopoulos et al. (2010) and Kontolaimou et al. (2017). The basic variables 
employed in our empirical investigation are the following: 
(1) Size: Turnover in million Euros, measured in natural logarithms. 
(2) Growth (i.e. Turnover Growth): Annual difference in firm size, as defined above. 
(3) Age: Distance between the current year and the year of first establishment 
adding unity, so that Age = 1 at the year of establishment. Measured in natural 
logarithms. 
(4) Leverage: [Total Assets - Equity] / Total Assets. 
(5) Fixed Assets: [Total Assets - Current Assets] / Total Assets. 
(6) Profitability: Earnings before Taxes / Total Assets.  
(7) Market Share: 100 x [Firm’s Turnover / Sector Turnover], where Sector Turnover 
is the aggregate turnover of all firms in the sector.  
(8) Attiki_D: Dummy variable equal to unity for firms located in Attiki and zero 
otherwise. 
(9) North_D: Dummy variable equal to unity for firms located in northern Greece 
and zero otherwise. 
(10) Year: The current year in the sample. 
 
                                                     
9 Lacking appropriate data to construct a direct liquidity indicator, we only indirectly condition on liquidity 
via the combined effect of other measured indicators, such as leverage or fixed investment. 
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The logarithmic transformations implemented on some of the above variables help 
reduce extreme variability and asymmetry in the annual cross-sectional distribution of 
the data and facilitate econometric estimation. Unreported quintile plots confirm that 
the main volume of the transformed data (>99%) is distributed within certain bounds 
that show little variation over time.  
 
4. Estimation of survival probabilities 
Following Heckman’s (1979) approach, we first consider the probability of firms 
surviving in the market. This probability is estimated using a Probit model (Bliss 1935), 
specified as follows: 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑖(𝑡+1) = 1|Ω𝑡) =  = Φ {𝑎1(𝑡) + 𝑎2(𝑡)𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖(𝑡)) + 𝑎3(𝑡) [𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖(𝑡)) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖(𝑡−1))] + ∑ 𝜃𝑘(𝑡)𝑋𝑖(𝑘,𝑡)𝐾𝑘=1 }, (1) 
where 𝑠𝑖(𝑡+1) denotes a binary variable that takes the value of one if the i-th firm survives 
in year t + 1 and zero otherwise. The total number of surviving firms in the market at 
time t is denoted by𝑁(𝑡), so that 𝑖 = 1, . . , 𝑁(𝑡). 𝑃𝑟(𝑠𝑖(𝑡+1) = 1|Ω𝑡) stands for the one 
period ahead survival probability, conditional on the current information set Ω𝑡. This 
probability is given by a function, Φ(. ), of a linear combination of the size of the i-th 
firm in year t,𝑆𝑖(𝑡), current growth, [𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖(𝑡)) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖(𝑡−1))], and a set of K firm-specific 
and market-specific variables, observed at time t, which are denoted by 𝑋𝑖(𝑘,𝑡), k = 1,..,K.  
The underlying assumption of the Probit model is that Φ(.) is the cumulative probability 
distribution function of the standard normal distribution, and φ(.) denotes the 
corresponding density function, namely: Φ(𝑧) = ∫ 1√2𝜋 exp (− 𝑥22 𝑑𝑥𝑧−∞ ), 𝑧~N(0,1), 𝜑(𝑧) = 𝜕𝛷{𝑧}𝜕𝑧 , (2) 
Alternatively, the Probit model may be specified in terms of the disturbance term 𝜈𝑖(𝑡+1) 
defined as: 𝜈𝑖(𝑡+1) = 𝑠𝑖(𝑡+1)∗ − {𝑎1(𝑡) + 𝑎2(𝑡)𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖(𝑡)) + 𝑎3(𝑡) [𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖(𝑡)) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖(𝑡−1))]  
+ ∑ 𝜃𝑘(𝑡)𝑋𝑖(𝑘,𝑡)𝐾𝑘=1 }, (3) 
where 𝑠𝑖(𝑡+1)∗ denotes a continuous unobservable variable, such that the binary 
variable 𝑠𝑖(𝑡+1)is unity, when 𝑠𝑖(𝑡+1)∗ > 0 and zero otherwise. The remaining terms and 
coefficients in equation (3) coincide with those in expression (1). The Probit normality 
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assumption is ensured by setting𝜈𝑖(𝑡+1)to follow the standard normal distribution, i.e. 𝜈𝑖(𝑡+1)~𝑁(0,1). 
The model is repeatedly estimated via Maximum Likelihood (ML) for each year and 
sector.10 We are particularly interested in the estimates (denoted by hat superscripts) 
of the one period ahead survival probabilities of each firm I (Φ̂𝑖), the respective densities 
(φ̂𝑖) and the alpha coefficients in equation (1) or, equivalently, in (3).Combining these 
estimates, we obtain the estimated marginal effect of each explanatory variable in the 
model, say Z, on the survival probability, 
𝜕Φ̂𝜕𝛧 , as the product of the (alpha) coefficient of 
the respective variable times the estimated density function (φ̂𝑖). For example, the 
marginal effect of size on the one period ahead survival probability is given by the 
term[𝑎2(𝑡)̂ φ̂𝑖]. In order to get a single estimate for each year-sector sub-sample, we 
average the estimated marginal effects across firms (cross-sections), obtaining the 
Average Marginal Effect (AME) following the procedure described in Greene (2012). 
To compare how the Average Marginal Effects might be affected by the economic crisis 
we further average these estimates taking the annual arithmetic mean for each sector 
over the two periods before and after the global crisis. The findings are depicted in 
Figure 8 and a brief commentary follows: 
Firm’s size exerts a positive impact on its survival probability in all sectors and over both 
periods. This is in line with stylised fact #2 examined in Section 2.The effect becomes 
roughly twice as strong after the crisis, with the strongest impact found for construction 
companies and those in the Real Estate, apart from Recreation. The implication is that 
lower-size companies associated with construction and housing sectors faced the 
prospect of exiting the market after the crisis at a rate much faster than firms in other 
sectors. This is in line with stylised fact #4 mentioned above. 
The age of being present in the market seems to help a firm to keep going and for some 
sectors, this applies somewhat stronger after the crisis. The impact is found to be more 
pronounced in the TLC, Recreation and Trade sectors, where personal ties is crucial in 
maintaining retail customers at times of sluggish demand.  
Leverage seems to exert a negative effect on survival throughout the period, though 
much stronger after the crisis. The effect seems far more pronounced in the 
construction sector, implying that its companies found it difficult to continue servicing 
their bank loans and had to exit the market. 
                                                     
10 As noted by Wooldridge (2002), Probit models can consistently estimate marginal effects even if 
normality is not the correct assumption. Heteroscedasticity, i.e. allowing for non-constant variance of the 
disturbance term in (3), results in a different functional form of the model and, therefore, cannot be 
corrected as in the linear regression model. As a robustness check, we compared our model’s goodness 
of fit to one’s allowing for size-related heteroscedasticity of the form 𝜈𝑖(𝑡+1)~𝑁 (0, 𝑘𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖(𝑡))), where k 
stands for a constant parameter. Using the Mac-Fadden R-square goodness of fit criterion, we found both 
models performing equally well with the statistic ranging between 10 and 30 percent across sub-samples. 
Consequently, we proceed with the simpler one, namely the homoscedastic-unit variance model. 
Estimation results are available by the authors. 
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Figure 8: Average marginal effects on survival probability by sector of activity. 
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A positive effect is detected for the ratio of firms’ fixed assets to total assets, that seems 
to be uniform for all sectors and becomes mildly stronger after 2008. Profitability exerts 
a similar positive impact, with the exception of construction firms. In that sector the size 
effect on survival is found to be weak and with a changing sign before and after the 
crisis. Market power, measured by firm’s market share, exerted a negative impact on 
survival, though of different magnitude across sectors before the crisis. After 2008, 
however, its effect turns positive for most of the sectors, except Trade and Recreation. 
Past changes (increases) in the ratio of fixed to total assets (reflecting new fixed 
investments) turn from positive to negative drivers of firms’ survival probability before 
and after the crisis.  In opposite, past changes (increases) in firm’s leverage turnover 
seem to exert a positive impact on survival before and after 2008. 
Finally, the location factor seems to exert a generally negative impact on firms operating 
in the wider Attiki region, with a slight exception of the TLC sector after the crisis. In 
contrast, a firm located in Northern Greece is likelier to survive in the market after the 
crisis. 
 
4. Estimation of Turnover Growth 
To estimate the effect of size on firms’ growth, we consider the following dynamic panel 
data model for the growth rate of the size, S, of firm i from year t to t+1: 𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖,𝑡+1) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑏1  +𝑏2𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑏3[𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖,𝑡) − 𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1)]  +𝑏4𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡+1̂ + ∑ 𝛽𝑚 ∙ 𝑊𝑖,𝑡(𝑚)𝑀𝑚=1 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡+1. (4) 
The model includes a set of M variables,  𝑊𝑖,𝑡(𝑚), m = 1,..,M, assumed to be relevant for 
forecasting growth in addition to the current size and past growth, [𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖,𝑡) −𝑙𝑛(𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1)]. The set contains the variables included in the Probit model described in the 
previous section, a dummy variable for the impact of the 2008 economic crisis and 
additional lags of turnover growth which help reduce in-sample serial correlation of the 
disturbance term u.11 The model allows also for the inclusion of unobserved firm-specific 
heterogeneity. 
We use an unbalanced panel dataset, i.e. the sample contains all firms that survive at 
least for three subsequent years (so that it is possible to calculate past growth variables 
included in equation (4)), over the total period covered by the data (2001-2014). To 
control for possible sample selection bias we include the term 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡+1̂  in the model, 
following Heckman (1979) and the generalisation to panel data by Wooldridge (2002). 
                                                     
11 There is low risk of multicollinearity in the model, since the correlations across the explanatory variables 
(elements of W) are fairly low. Results for these cross-correlations are unreported and available by the 
authors. 
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The term denotes an estimate of the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) associated with the 
probability of firms’ survival and defined as:  𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝜑𝑖𝑡+1𝛷𝑖𝑡+1,     (5) 
where Φ𝑖𝑡+1 and φ𝑖𝑡+1 have been defined in the previous section to be the survival 
probability of firm i in year t+1 and its probability density respectively. Under suitable 
conditions, demonstrated in Wooldridge (2002), consistent estimates of these 
quantities can be obtained from the Probit estimates of the previous section.12 Equation 
(4) is a dynamic panel data model, since the dependent variable appears in lagged form 
in the right hand side. This differentiates the method of estimation depending on 
whether one assumes the existence of firm specific heterogeneity and fixed effects or 
not. 
To get a first set of estimates under an unspecified form of firm-specific heterogeneity, 
we repeatedly estimate the model (4) with the correction term (in equation (5)) for each 
year and sector. Following Lotti et al. (2009), we present, in Figure 9, the Maximum 
Likelihood estimates of β-coefficients in the summation term in the Rhs of (4) in terms 
of their average (arithmetic mean) value over the two periods before and after 2008.13 
The size coefficient estimates are found relatively small and negative, in line with 
stylised fact #1 mentioned in Section 2.  
The only exception occurs in the construction sector whereas the strong and negative 
effect implies serious difficulties for the expansion of large-scale construction firms both 
before and after the crisis, thus confirming stylised fact #3. The coefficients on age, 
leverage, turnover growth in the past appear to be negative in most sectors, suggesting 
that more recently set-up and/or low-leveraged firms are more likely to expand faster. 
Only older construction firms enjoy a positive age effect on growth after the crisis, but 
this seems too tiny to have any serious impact. 
                                                     
12 Briefly stated, the correction via inclusion of IMR in (4) works as follows: if u was subject to selection 
bias, Wooldridge (2002) shows (under normality and suitable assumptions), that (𝑢𝑖,𝑡+1|Ω𝑡 , 𝑠𝑖(𝑡+1) = 1) =𝛾𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖(𝑡+1) , where γ stands for a constant parameter. The method therefore adds an otherwise omitted 
(but relevant) variable in the model, 𝐼𝑀𝑅𝑖(𝑡+1), rendering the disturbance term u uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables included in the model. In the traditional Heckit approach, the sign of the parameter  
γ is a function of the correlation between the disturbances in the growth and survival equations, i.e. the 
terms u in (4) and ν in (3), respectively.   
13 Lotti et al. (2009) have previously adopted this approach in their study of the Italian market. In addition 
to the two step (TS) approach originally proposed by Heckman and presented here, they also present 
results from joint Maximum Likelihood estimation of the system of equations (1)-(4) based on multivariate 
normality. This method allows for contemporaneous correlation between the disturbance terms of the 
survival and growth equations. Lotti et al. (2009) argue that ML estimates are also superior to the original 
TS approach in term of efficiency and bias. Figure 9 presents those ML estimates while ‘Two-Stage’ 
estimation results remain unreported and available by the authors. 
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Figure 9: Average coefficients of the growth equation by sector of activity. 
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Profitability, market power and the ratio of fixed assets are positively associated with 
expansion in most sectors. Finally, the regional location after the crisis seems to exert a 
negative effect on expansion for those in Attica and in the North. The stronger adverse 
effect noticed in the Recreation sector in Northern Greece is probably associated with 
the reduced tourist flows from neighboring countries, as they were also hit by the 
economic crisis. 
For a more formal assessment of the statistical significance of the above effects and the 
impact of economic crisis on their magnitude and direction, we turn to dynamic panel 
data estimation. This way allows us to take account of the dynamics of the growth model 
(1) and obtain estimates that are therefore more reliable14. We incorporate the effect 
of crisis on growth adding an appropriate dummy variable for the period 2009-2014, i.e. 
“YEAR>2008”, as an explanatory variable in the model. We also include the interaction 
of this dummy with the other explanatory variables in the model in order to capture any 
difference in the impact of each explanatory variable on growth before and after the 
outburst of the crisis, and proceed in three stages: 
 
5.1. Preliminary estimates 
We first estimate the model using simple Panel Least Squares assuming no firm-specific 
fixed effects. Estimates with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in 
Table II below. 
[Table II approximately here] 
The results of Table II lead to a non-rejection of Gibrat’s Law for most sectors, since the 
coefficient of lagged size, i.e. SIZE(-1), is found to be statistically insignificant.15The 
coefficient of the interaction term (YEAR>2008)*SIZE(-1), is found positive for most of 
the sectors indicating that the intensity of the negative relationship between growth 
and size is mitigated after 2008 in a direction towards Gibrat’s Law predictions. 
However, the effect is statistically insignificant.   
 
5.2. Cross-section effects 
Unless the model is transformed, implementation of cross-section fixed effects 
estimation via Least Squares would produce biased results, as pointed out by Nickell 
(1981). Due to the nature of our system, most likely the coefficient of the lagged size will 
be downward biased, although the magnitude of the bias is unknown16.  
                                                     
14 For a related discussion, see Wawro (2002). 
15 Bond et al. (2005), in a related simulation study, show that a simple t-test on the coefficient of lagged 
size is capable of testing the null hypothesis of unit root, which in our case corresponds to the hypothesis 
that Gibrat’s Law holds. 
16 The bias is of order 1/T, where T is the number of years in the sample. 
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Estimation under cross-section fixed effects is carried out by appropriately transforming 
the model so that firm specific heterogeneity is excluded from the transformed model. 
Table III presents potentially ‘biased’ coefficient estimates that result from applying 
Panel Least Squares with cross-section fixed effects on our dynamic panel data equation. 
It is worth noting here that the use of fixed effects implicitly accounts for other non-
specified characteristics of the corporations in the sample; for example, whether they 
are private or public sector entities,  etc. 
[Table III approximately here] 
In contrast to the previous estimates, the estimates of the lagged-size variable now 
appear to be negative, larger in magnitude and statistically significant, thus rejecting 
Gibrat’s Law. The estimated cross-section fixed effects are found to be highly correlated 
with the lagged size variable (about 80%) and IMR (about -40%), a fact that explains the 
large differences (relative to the previous estimates) in the estimated coefficients of the 
respective variables.17 Moreover, a statistically significant positive effect of size on 
growth is estimated for two out of six sectors after the beginning of the economic crisis 
(crisis effect).  
 
5.3. GMM estimates 
Potential cross-section fixed effects are excluded by taking first differences on both side 
of (4), as suggested by Arellano et al.(1991). Since, however, our dependent variable is 
already in first differences, we opted for the method proposed by the sequel Arellano 
et al. (1995), which uses ‘orthogonal deviations’ instead of first differences. In the 
transformed model, we apply Generalised Method of Moments estimation with 
appropriate instruments, taking account that the method does not induce serial 
correlation in the disturbance term of the transformed model. This method avoids 
problems associated with highly persistent series and ‘weak instruments’ and has been 
also found to exhibit comparable performance to the traditional method by Arellano et 
al. (1991); see Hayakawa (2009) or Canarella et al. (2018). Table IV summarizes the 
estimation results. 
[Tables IVA & IVB approximately here] 
A statistically significant negative relationship between growth and size is again 
established, though of smaller magnitude than the results of Table III, implying that the 
aforementioned ‘Nickell’ bias is somewhat mitigated. Rejecting Gibrat’s law under fixed 
effects also implies that firm size exhibits a ‘stationary’ or ‘mean-reverting’ behavior, 
with larger firms being more difficult to expand than smaller ones. This effect holds 
uniformly across all sectors, but TLC. Similarly, a negative (and, for most sectors, 
statistically significant) effect of age on growth has been established, postulating that 
further growth opportunities diminish as a firm grows older in the market.The effect 
reveals that after a firm is established in the Greek market, it shows a limited capacity 
for innovation and continuous expansion, thus becoming more vulnerable in a 
                                                     
17 The estimated correlations are available upon request. 
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downturn. The finding is consistent with the conclusions reached by Evans (1987) on the 
relationship between growth, size and age. 
The inclusion of the Inverse Mills Ratio is found to be statistically significant in most 
sectors.18 Since it is inversely related with the probability of survival, a positive 
coefficient implies that firms with lower survival probability (i.e. higher IMR) achieve 
higher growth rates. This result is consistent with the view that smaller firms have lower 
survival probability but higher growth potentials. Given that firm-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity has been removed from the model by taking orthogonal deviations, this 
finding implies that firm’s survival has time-specific characteristics and cannot be 
treated as a firm-specific unobserved effect in econometric applications.  
The remaining estimated coefficients are found to be statistically significant for just a 
few sectors, a fact that highlights the role different sectors play on firms’ growth. The 
effect of other growth-related firm characteristics, identified by previous studies, such 
as investment in fixed assets, leverage and profitability, seems to differ before and after 
2008 and it is also found to be statistically significant for some sectors only, as said 
above. 
 
5. Conclusions 
By examining a large data set of Greek companies over the period 2001-2014, we 
established certain characteristics regarding the role of company size on survival and 
turnover growth. A key finding is that larger-size firms are in general more likely to 
survive in the market than smaller size ones, and this relative size advantage grows 
stronger during a crisis, albeit to a different degree across the spectrum of economic 
activity. Focusing on sectors, it is evident that large companies in the manufacturing 
sector are by far more robust over the cycle, while those in the Real Estate and 
construction sectors manifest the highest extinction rate. 
Regarding the role of firms’ size on turnover growth, the conclusion is less clear-cut. 
Without taking into account firm-specific characteristics, there is no significant size 
effect on their growth potential, in accordance with the insights of Gibrat’s Law. 
However, the picture radically changes by including time-invariant firm-specific effects. 
It is now found that, across all sectors of activity, larger-size firms are less probable to 
see their turnover expanding fast enough in an upswing or suffering only limited losses 
in a downturn.  
Therefore, idiosyncratic characteristics of the firm seem to be more critical for exploiting 
market niches than general patterns of size and sector. A plausible explanation is that in 
Greece product markets are fragmented and over-regulated, thus making rent-seeking 
                                                     
18 We acknowledge that the reported standard errors may be biased estimates of the true estimation 
uncertainty, since the Inverse Mills Ratio is a byproduct of a first step Probit estimation and therefore 
subject to estimation errors. Since the purpose of the current study is only to control for possible sample 
selection effects and not to assess their magnitude we leave the issue open to future research.  
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practices for small-size firms to be easier or politically more expedient than for bigger 
ones. 
The role that size plays on the survival and expansion of firms may have substantial 
implications for policy options aiming at speeding-up economic recovery. For example, 
to avoid the closure of small firms, the Government or the banking system need to set 
up emergency credit facilities to provide companies with working capital, adequate to 
keep them in business during a crisis. In the same logic, partial covering of employment 
costs by emergency grants or a greater flexibility in wage and job-schedule 
arrangements will help lessening operational costs and, thus, raise their chances of 
survival in a crisis. 
Another policy implication regards larger size firms and the need for supporting them to 
improve competitiveness and increase turnover. In several instances, Governments -as 
well as European authorities-frequently choose to concentrate on small firms for 
creating or disseminating innovation, as they are considered more flexible and efficient 
in experimenting with new technologies. However, this may be counterproductive 
during a crisis because small technology firms may become extinct as any other of similar 
size, before they manage to disseminate their results to other firms.  
Since larger firms are more likely to stay in operation during a crisis, innovation policy 
should be directed toward them too in order to facilitate adjustment and accelerate the 
return to growth. However, this kind of support does not amount to the tendency of 
banking institutions to keep a large defunct company in a state of artificial existence, 
merely to avoid the losses from appearing in their own balance sheet. In fact, the sooner 
defunct companies are written-off, the more room they make for credit to be channeled 
to those better equipped to survive.  
Hence, a dual strategy based on credit-enhancing measures for small-size firms and 
innovation-supporting policies for larger ones seems to be more promising. This 
direction is reminiscing of the creative destruction process as described by Schumpeter 
(1931): several firms are destroyed in the downturn of the cycle but then some of them 
manage to adjust to new technology and productivity requirements and start growing 
again, thus spearheading the upswing of economic activity. Smaller firms must be ready 
to jump on board when the boat sails again. 
Future research perspectives include the investigation of corporate dynamics in 
connection with labour market characteristics, such as the level of employment, 
protection status and the wage formation process. We shall also investigate 
comparative dynamics along alternative groupings of firms, such as those belonging to 
the tradable versus non-tradable sectors, export-led firms versus import-based ones, 
knowledge-based versus labour-intensive, etc. Other grouping may be formed on the 
basis of local conditions, e.g. areas of high versus low unemployment, educational 
attainment, existence of natural resources, etc.19 
                                                     
19 The specific research perspective was suggested by an anonymous referee. 
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Appendix 
TABLE II: PANEL LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION OF THE GROWTH EQUATION (4) 
  Manufacturing Construction Trade Recreation TLC Real Estate All 6 
Variable Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. 
CONSTANT -1.66 0.89 -27.96 0.16 13.53 0.39 -2.94 0.76 -7.71 0.53 -15.83 0.18 -20.02 0.48 
YEAR>2008 -60.75 0.00 -37.85 0.44 -66.57 0.01 -47.44 0.07 -29.47 0.07 3.21 0.93 -39.77 0.24 
SIZE(-1) 0.00 0.38 -0.04 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.00 0.94 -0.01 0.35 -0.02 0.14 -0.00 0.45 
      × (YEAR>2008) 0.01 0.33 -0.02 0.37 0.00 0.77 -0.01 0.35 0.01 0.62 0.01 0.36 0.00 0.86 
AGE(-1) -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.07 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.14 -0.00 0.91 
      × (YEAR>2008) -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.38 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.27 0.02 0.44 -0.02 0.26 -0.01 0.34 
LEVERAGE (-1) -0.01 0.36 0.07 0.22 -0.10 0.00 -0.10 0.11 -0.03 0.39 -0.03 0.14 0.00 0.69 
      × (YEAR>2008) -0.04 0.50 -0.13 0.11 -0.05 0.15 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.95 -0.03 0.36 -0.05 0.00 
FIXED ASSETS (-1) 0.16 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.22 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.00 
      × (YEAR>2008) -0.05 0.12 -0.04 0.75 -0.03 0.24 -0.09 0.15 -0.02 0.65 0.05 0.42 0.04 0.19 
PROFITABILITY RATIO (-1) 0.25 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.28 0.01 0.26 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.88 0.15 0.00 
      × (YEAR>2008) 0.06 0.59 0.01 0.93 0.17 0.18 -0.10 0.41 0.05 0.54 0.05 0.53 0.06 0.39 
MARKET SHARE (-1)  0.01 0.26 0.05 0.14 -0.06 0.26 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.33 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.16 
      × (YEAR>2008) -0.01 0.34 0.04 0.26 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.43 -0.05 0.30 0.00 0.78 
Δ LEVERAGE (-1) 0.21 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.49 -0.04 0.45 0.01 0.86 
      × (YEAR>2008) -0.08 0.39 -0.07 0.54 0.13 0.10 -0.03 0.58 -0.04 0.50 0.08 0.24 0.09 0.17 
Δ FIXED ASSETS (-1) -0.15 0.02 -0.34 0.10 -0.02 0.76 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.91 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.89 
      × (YEAR>2008) -0.02 0.91 -0.28 0.29 -0.21 0.11 -0.01 0.85 0.17 0.38 0.06 0.57 -0.13 0.02 
ATTIKI_D -0.04 0.00 -0.09 0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.05 0.27 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.55 -0.03 0.00 
      × (YEAR>2008) 0.01 0.47 0.05 0.35 0.03 0.20 -0.03 0.63 -0.06 0.16 -0.03 0.44 -0.01 0.39 
NORTH_D -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.87 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.74 0.02 0.36 0.03 0.44 -0.01 0.06 
      × (YEAR>2008) 0.01 0.32 -0.01 0.88 0.05 0.06 -0.05 0.15 0.00 0.92 -0.02 0.75 -0.02 0.13 
IMR 0.53 0.05 0.97 0.01 1.09 0.00 1.26 0.00 0.13 0.76 0.91 0.00 0.25 0.01 
      × (YEAR>2008) -0.40 0.26 -0.77 0.11 -0.48 0.03 -1.05 0.02 0.23 0.68 -0.24 0.58 -0.20 0.04 
YEAR 0.00 0.89 0.01 0.15 -0.01 0.37 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.52 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.48 
      × (YEAR>2008) 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.44 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.92 0.02 0.25 
Δ SIZE (-1) 0.01 0.54 -0.20 0.00 0.06 0.00 -0.13 0.00 0.00 0.97 -0.05 0.00 -0.07 0.00 
Δ SIZE (-2)   -0.08 0.00   -0.07 0.00     -0.01 0.07 
Δ SIZE (-3)       -0.02 0.02     0.00 0.93 
Cross-sections included:  6024  1799  8473  3059  1235  3724  21339  
Total panel (unbalanced) obs.:  48501  11597  64894  22376  8620  25609  142729  
R-squared 0.04  0.10  0.05  0.06  0.02  0.04  0.04  
Adjusted R-squared 0.04  0.10  0.05  0.06  0.02  0.04  0.04  
First Order Correlation (Q-stat) 4.45 0.04 3.16 0.08 0.01 0.91 0.05 0.83 4.43 0.04 4.19 0.04 0.00 0.99 
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates and diagnostics from simple Panel Least Squares estimation of the growth equation (4). In addition to the variables described in the text, the growth equation 
contains a dummy variable ‘YEAR>2008’ with observations that take the value of unity for all years after 2008 and zero otherwise, and its interaction with all other explanatory variables. The reported p-
values for the coefficients correspond to White cross-section standard errors & covariance (with degrees of freedom correction). IMR is estimated from the Probit Model described in equation (1) as a 
proxy for the Inverse Mills Ratio defined in equation (5). Additional lags of growth (ΔSIZE) are used in order to mitigate first order autocorrelation in the residuals tested by the Q-statistic (last row of the 
Table). Source: Hellastat database. 
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TABLE III: PANEL LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATION OF THE GROWTH EQUATION (4) WITH CROSS-SECTION FIXED EFFECTS 
  Manufacturing Construction Trade   Recreation TLC   Real Estate All 6 
Variable Coeff. Prob.   Coeff. Prob.   Coeff. Prob.   Coeff. Prob.   Coeff. Prob.   Coeff. Prob.   Coeff. Prob.   
CONSTANT -2.30 0.85 -45.5 0.20 0.76 0.96 -61.79 0.00 -16.08 0.34 -23.82 0.14 -23.77 0.38 
YEAR>2008 7.16 0.79 157.1 0.07 18.70 0.57 8.58 0.78 23.38 0.35 94.29 0.04 52.65 0.21 
SIZE(-1) -0.28 0.00 -0.61 0.00 -0.28 0.00 -0.49 0.00 -0.40 0.00 -0.42 0.00 -0.39 0.00 
      × (YEAR>2008) 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.71 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.74 0.01 0.12 -0.01 0.74 0.01 0.05 
AGE(-1) -0.04 0.16 -0.06 0.43 -0.10 0.00 -0.26 0.00 -0.11 0.06 -0.05 0.31 -0.09 0.00 
      × (YEAR>2008) -0.05 0.00 -0.10 0.14 -0.09 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 0.64 -0.06 0.13 -0.06 0.01 
LEVERAGE (-1) 0.02 0.54 0.26 0.00 -0.06 0.19 -0.03 0.67 -0.04 0.16 -0.05 0.10 0.02 0.32 
      × (YEAR>2008) -0.06 0.26 -0.23 0.10 -0.12 0.02 0.05 0.41 -0.07 0.05 -0.02 0.54 -0.09 0.00 
FIXED ASSETS (-1) 0.09 0.01 -0.25 0.01 -0.01 0.72 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.46 0.11 0.03 -0.13 0.00 
      × (YEAR>2008) 0.02 0.53 0.33 0.00 -0.08 0.03 0.08 0.16 0.03 0.40 0.14 0.00 0.19 0.00 
PROFITABILITY RATIO (-1) 0.09 0.16 0.20 0.11 0.18 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.07 0.51 -0.09 0.00 0.02 0.42 
      × (YEAR>2008) 0.23 0.05 0.51 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.51 0.18 0.00 0.23 0.00 
MARKET SHARE (-1)  0.08 0.04 0.31 0.00 0.54 0.00 1.14 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.10 0.00 
      × (YEAR>2008) -0.03 0.13 -0.05 0.54 -0.03 0.72 0.07 0.38 0.01 0.09 -0.07 0.15 -0.01 0.26 
Δ LEVERAGE (-1) 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.87 0.17 0.00 0.06 0.18 0.04 0.43 -0.03 0.22 0.00 0.94 
      × (YEAR>2008) -0.04 0.63 0.33 0.00 0.03 0.68 0.09 0.34 0.01 0.85 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.00 
Δ FIXED ASSETS (-1) -0.16 0.00 -0.14 0.24 0.05 0.31 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.48 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.14 
      × (YEAR>2008) -0.09 0.55 -0.36 0.03 -0.22 0.01 -0.10 0.17 0.00 0.99 -0.04 0.64 -0.20 0.02 
IMR 0.74 0.00 0.84 0.10 1.08 0.00 1.15 0.01 0.39 0.29 0.92 0.00 0.75 0.00 
      × (YEAR>2008) -0.83 0.02 -0.81 0.30 -0.72 0.11 -1.12 0.01 -0.35 0.55 -0.68 0.09 -0.78 0.02 
YEAR 0.00 0.61 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.80 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.27 
      × (YEAR>2008) 0.00 0.77 -0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.56 0.00 0.78 -0.01 0.35 -0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.21 
Δ SIZE (-1) 0.01 0.77 0.02 0.68 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.38 0.03 0.32 0.01 0.68 0.01 0.57 
Δ SIZE (-2)     0.01 0.65     0.02 0.18         0.02 0.10 
Δ SIZE (-3)       0.02 0.09     0.01 0.29 
Cross-sections included:  6024   1799  8473   3059   1235   3724   21339   
Total panel (unbalanced) obs.:  48501   11597  64894   22376   8620   25609   142729   
R-squared 0.29   0.38   0.33   0.34   0.37   0.35   0.33   
Adjusted R-squared 0.19   0.26   0.21   0.24   0.26   0.24   0.22   
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates and diagnostics from Panel Least Squares estimation of the growth equation (4) allowing for cross-section fixed effects. The reported 
estimates are subject to bias due to the dynamic nature of the equation (Nickell 1981) and serve as a benchmark to evaluate estimates that are robust to that bias, such as GMM 
estimators reported in the following Table. Source: Hellastat database. 
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TABLE IVA: GENERALISED METHOD OF MOMENTS ESTIMATION OF GROWTH EQUATION (4)  WITH CROSS-SECTION FIXED EFFECTS 
  Manufacturing Construction Trade Recreation TLC Real Estate All 6 
Variable Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. 
YEAR>2008 -5.80 0.84 62.9 0.39 -32.68 0.43 -37.31 0.52 26.81 0.58 100.08 0.01 132.56 0.00 
SIZE(-1) -0.18 0.08 -0.30 0.03 -0.16 0.09 -0.45 0.01 -0.25 0.17 -0.21 0.02 -0.19 0.18 
× (YEAR>2008) 0.06 0.00 -0.20 0.03 0.01 0.53 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.00 -0.01 0.69 
AGE(-1) -0.14 0.01 -0.50 0.04 -0.20 0.01 0.07 0.59 -0.03 0.85 -0.25 0.02 -0.75 0.00 
× (YEAR>2008) -0.13 0.00 -0.34 0.07 -0.13 0.00 -0.09 0.07 0.03 0.74 -0.19 0.02 -0.15 0.00 
LEVERAGE (-1) -0.05 0.46 0.21 0.80 0.14 0.65 -0.18 0.34 -0.02 0.90 -0.06 0.59 -0.29 0.43 
× (YEAR>2008) -0.27 0.01 -0.11 0.86 -0.18 0.09 -0.04 0.68 -0.15 0.40 -0.25 0.07 -0.52 0.00 
FIXED ASSETS (-1) 0.37 0.23 -1.26 0.52 -1.58 0.07 0.64 0.23 1.35 0.23 0.91 0.10 -1.82 0.01 
× (YEAR>2008) 0.26 0.08 -0.77 0.44 -0.55 0.04 0.42 0.15 0.60 0.19 0.42 0.03 -0.30 0.11 
PROFITABILITY (-1) -0.09 0.38 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.25 0.02 -0.03 0.90 -0.15 0.01 -0.09 0.33 
× (YEAR>2008) 0.57 0.00 -0.28 0.47 0.01 0.96 0.84 0.01 -0.26 0.30 0.11 0.25 0.31 0.07 
MARKET SHARE (-1)  0.06 0.27 -0.33 0.03 -0.27 0.20 -0.93 0.58 0.05 0.29 0.34 0.24 -0.13 0.36 
× (YEAR>2008) -0.04 0.07 0.41 0.00 0.11 0.24 -0.64 0.19 -0.04 0.41 -0.22 0.07 0.02 0.68 
Δ LEVERAGE (-1) 0.16 0.05 0.18 0.32 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.09 0.31 -0.05 0.31 0.03 0.62 
× (YEAR>2008) -0.01 0.94 0.05 0.90 -0.06 0.59 -0.17 0.24 -0.06 0.52 0.08 0.18 0.05 0.49 
Δ FIXED ASSETS (-1) -0.20 0.00 -0.14 0.73 0.11 0.34 0.07 0.48 -0.05 0.76 -0.07 0.63 0.18 0.10 
× (YEAR>2008) 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.58 -0.14 0.38 -0.09 0.48 -0.17 0.39 -0.07 0.62 -0.04 0.75 
IMR 0.42 0.02 5.24 0.00 1.10 0.00 0.94 0.01 0.71 0.02 0.34 0.37 0.26 0.24 
× (YEAR>2008) -0.20 0.46 -5.39 0.00 -1.31 0.01 -0.92 0.07 -0.47 0.33 0.76 0.11 -0.14 0.64 
YEAR 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.95 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.00 
      × (YEAR>2008) 0.00 0.86 -0.03 0.42 0.02 0.43 0.02 0.53 -0.01 0.57 -0.05 0.01 -0.07 0.00 
Δ SIZE (-1) -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.55 -0.01 0.66 0.02 0.72 0.02 0.52 -0.04 0.05 -0.22 0.00 
Δ SIZE (-2)   -0.08 0.32   0.08 0.28     0.07 0.22 
Δ SIZE (-3)       0.30 0.00     -0.95 0.00 
Cross-sections included:  5646  1629    2898  1108  3063  19809 
Total panel (unbalanced) obs.:  42477  9798    19317  7385  18502  121390 
Periods included 11  10  10  9  11  10  9 
J-stat 17.62 0.02 12.47 0.03 13.33 0.21 15.97 0.04 8.81 0.36 19.20 0.04 6.26 0.39 
Instrument Set: II  I  III  III  II  III  II 
Instrument Sets: 
  
  
I 
CONSTANT, YEAR>2008, YEAR, YEAR > 2008, SIZE(t), SIZE(t) x (YEAR>2008), AGE(t), AGE(t) x (YEAR>2008), LEVERAGE(t), LEVERAGE(t) x (YEAR>2008),  FIXED ASSETS(t), FIXED 
ASSETS(t) x (YEAR>2008), PROFITABILITY(t), PROFITABILITY(t) x (YEAR>2008), MARKET SHARE(t), MARKET SHARE(t) x (YEAR>2008), t = {-2,-3} 
II All variables in I plus IMR(-1) 
III All variables in I plus IMR(-1) and IMR(-2) 
Notes: Table shows coefficient estimates and diagnostics from Generalised Method of Moments estimation of the growth equation (4) allowing for cross-section fixed effects. The 
latter are removed taking orthogonal deviations (Arellano et al., 1995). In addition to the variables described in the text, the growth equation contains a dummy variable ‘YEAR>2008’ 
with observations that take the value of unity for all years after 2008 and zero otherwise, and its interaction with all other explanatory variables. Reported p-values for the coefficients 
correspond to White period standard errors & covariance (with degrees of freedom correction). IMR isestimated from the Probit Model described in equation (1) as a proxy for the 
Inverse Mills Ratio defined in equation (5). The three instrument sets used in the estimation are reported below the row with the J-test for over-identified restrictions. Results support 
non-strict rejection (at least 1%level) of our instruments’ choices. Source: Hellastat database. 
  
4 
TABLE IVB: GENERALISED METHOD OF MOMENTS ESTIMATION OF GROWTH EQUATION (4)  WITH CROSS-SECTION FIXED EFFECTS (WHITE DIAGONAL WEIGHTING AND COVARIANCE) 
  Manufacturing Construction Trade Recreation TLC Real Estate All 6 
Variable Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. Coeff. Prob. 
YEAR>2008 -5.05 0.85 67.29 0.34 -58.32 0.23 -35.40 0.69 30.83 0.55 67.33 0.10 40.04 0.17 
SIZE(-1) -0.18 0.06 -0.29 0.03 -0.16 0.14 -0.46 0.05 -0.23 0.24 -0.16 0.09 -0.18 0.10 
× (YEAR>2008) 0.06 0.00 -0.19 0.02 0.01 0.72 0.02 0.50 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.00 
AGE(-1) -0.15 0.00 -0.46 0.04 -0.23 0.00 0.13 0.38 0.00 0.97 -0.26 0.01 -0.24 0.00 
× (YEAR>2008) -0.14 0.00 -0.33 0.06 -0.15 0.00 -0.08 0.09 0.05 0.52 -0.20 0.01 -0.09 0.00 
LEVERAGE (-1) -0.04 0.63 0.19 0.80 0.20 0.51 -0.17 0.39 -0.03 0.87 -0.10 0.41 -0.18 0.48 
× (YEAR>2008) -0.24 0.00 -0.07 0.90 -0.16 0.12 0.08 0.55 -0.17 0.26 -0.20 0.15 -0.39 0.00 
FIXED ASSETS (-1) 0.36 0.26 -1.03 0.57 -2.22 0.01 0.64 0.21 1.64 0.09 0.78 0.15 -1.01 0.04 
× (YEAR>2008) 0.24 0.10 -0.65 0.48 -0.73 0.00 0.35 0.19 0.67 0.09 0.37 0.07 -0.13 0.31 
PROFITABILITY (-1) -0.15 0.14 0.77 0.00 -0.01 0.91 0.39 0.01 -0.05 0.81 -0.17 0.01 -0.05 0.41 
× (YEAR>2008) 0.61 0.00 -0.45 0.27 -0.01 0.98 0.86 0.03 -0.30 0.23 0.10 0.29 0.34 0.00 
MARKET SHARE (-1)  0.07 0.29 -0.31 0.12 -0.32 0.18 -2.09 0.42 0.06 0.35 0.11 0.74 -0.22 0.03 
× (YEAR>2008) -0.05 0.05 0.35 0.01 0.14 0.11 -0.73 0.34 -0.04 0.39 -0.23 0.00 0.00 0.88 
Δ LEVERAGE (-1) 0.12 0.08 0.20 0.30 0.10 0.21 0.17 0.00 0.09 0.34 -0.05 0.34 -0.02 0.78 
× (YEAR>2008) 0.05 0.69 -0.03 0.94 -0.08 0.53 -0.13 0.38 -0.06 0.54 0.08 0.21 0.18 0.01 
Δ FIXED ASSETS (-1) -0.21 0.00 -0.12 0.74 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.59 -0.10 0.54 -0.04 0.75 0.14 0.08 
× (YEAR>2008) 0.16 0.17 0.07 0.82 -0.17 0.31 -0.08 0.59 -0.14 0.50 -0.05 0.71 -0.10 0.19 
IMR 0.33 0.09 5.24 0.00 1.11 0.00 1.51 0.12 0.68 0.04 0.50 0.21 0.45 0.01 
× (YEAR>2008) -0.13 0.63 -5.61 0.00 -1.56 0.00 -1.72 0.04 -0.36 0.45 0.47 0.34 -0.29 0.20 
YEAR 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.86 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 
      × (YEAR>2008) 0.00 0.87 -0.03 0.36 0.03 0.23 0.02 0.69 -0.02 0.53 -0.03 0.10 -0.02 0.17 
Δ SIZE (-1) -0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.49 0.00 0.87 -0.03 0.79 0.01 0.82 -0.04 0.06 -0.10 0.01 
Δ SIZE (-2)     -0.08 0.32     -0.09 0.48         -0.06 0.06 
Δ SIZE (-3)         0.44 0.01     0.04 0.57 
Cross-sections included:  5646   1629   7249   2898  1108   3063   19809 
Total panel (unbalanced) obs.:  42477   9798   48537   19317  7385   18502   121390 
Periods included 11   10   10   9  11   10   9.00 
J-stat 17.47 0.03 14.67 0.01 15.94 0.16   0.23 9.08 0.34 19.59 0.03 17.49 0.03 
Instrument Set: II   I   III   Ι   II   III   ΙΙΙ 
Instrument Sets: 
  
  
I 
CONSTANT, YEAR>2008, YEAR, YEAR > 2008, SIZE(t), SIZE(t) x (YEAR>2008), AGE(t), AGE(t) x (YEAR>2008), LEVERAGE(t), LEVERAGE(t) x (YEAR>2008),  FIXED ASSETS(t), FIXED 
ASSETS(t) x (YEAR>2008), PROFITABILITY(t), PROFITABILITY(t) x (YEAR>2008), MARKET SHARE(t), MARKET SHARE(t) x (YEAR>2008), t = {-2,-3} 
II All variables in I plus IMR(-1) 
III All variables in I plus IMR(-1) and IMR(-2) 
Notes: Estimation output as in the previous Table, based on an alternative weighting scheme (White’s diagonal) for the GMM estimates and their variance-covariance matrix. Results 
remain qualitatively similar; it is worth noting the overall effect of size on growth after 2008 for all six sectors, which turns positive and statistically significant. Source: Hellastat 
database. 
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